



3. Zeno said, "If multiple things *exist*, then things must be both and like each other and unlike each other, but things *can't* be both alike and unlike, so multiple things *don't* exist." Yet on the basis of the theory of ideal forms, Socrates disagreed with Zeno.

(i) According to Socrates, how can things be *alike* (or be *like* each other)?

(ii) According to Socrates, how can things be *unlike* (or be *unlike* each other)?

(iii) According to Socrates, can two separate things ever be both like each other and unlike each other at the very same time? Why or why not? Explain.

(iv) According to Socrates, how can something possibly be *one* thing and *multiple* things at the very same time?

4. Socrates considered the unity of opposites theory.

(i) According to Socrates, what kinds of things *can* be opposite things at the very same time?

(ii) According to Socrates, what kinds of things *can't* be opposite things at the very same time?

5. On the one hand, Socrates was *sure* about whether or not *certain* ideal forms exist. Yet on the hand, he was *unsure* about whether or not certain *other* ideal forms exist.

(i) According to Socrates, what are *at least four* ideal forms that surely *exist*?

(ii) Socrates was *unsure* about whether or not certain other ideal forms exist. What are *three* examples of such ideal forms?

(iii) According to Socrates, what are *three* ideal forms that surely *don't* exist?

6. According to Socrates, if the 'one-over-many' theory is true, then everything that participates in greatness (μέγεθος) is something great (μέγας), everything that participates in beauty (κάλλος) is something that is beautiful (καλός), everything that participates in justice (δικαιοσύνη) is something just (δίκαιά), and so on. In light of that reasoning of his, answer the following questions.

(i) If something participates in *heaviness*, then what is it?

(ii) If something participates in *redness*, then what is it?

(iii) If something participates in *sweetness*, then what is it?

(iv) If something participates in *hotness* (or *heat*), then what is it?

(v) If something participates in *humanness* (or the essence of *humankind*), then what is it?

(vi) If something participates in *fieriness* (or the ideal form of *fire*), then what is it?

(vii) If something participates in *wateriness* (or the ideal form of *water*), then what is it?

(viii) If something participates in *hairiness* (or the ideal form of *hair*), then what is it?

(ix) If something participates in *muddiness* (or the ideal form of *mud*), then what is it?

(x) Is something participates in *worthlessness*, then what is it?

7. Against the *theory of ideal forms*, Parmenides proposed the *third man argument*.

(i) According to Parmenides, what is the only way for greatness to be great?

(ii) According to Parmenides, if greatness is great, then why can't there be only one greatness (or ideal form of the great)?

(iii) According to Parmenides, if *every* greatness is something great, then *how many* greatnesses exist?

8. The Greatest Difficulty (or *Aporia*)

(i) According to Parmenides, the gods can know *only* about *which* things?

(ii) According to Parmenides, the gods *cannot* know about *which* things?

(iii) According to Parmenides, humans can know *only* about *which* things?

(iv) According to Parmenides, humans *cannot* know about *which* things?

9. According to Parmenides, if something has no parts at all, then why does it have no shape at all?

10. According to Parmenides, if something has no parts at all, then why can't it change place (or move from one place to another place)?