Xenophanes Questions

1. Along with Anaximenes and Pythagoras, Xenophanes was one of Anaximander's students. After he'd learned Milesian Ionian philosophy from Anaximander, Xenophanes had learned Pythagoreanism from Pythagoras. Although he did not agree with the Pythagorean doctrine that the monad is the the ἀρχή of everything, Xenophanes apparently came to believe in μετεμψύχωσις, which he had learned from his fellow Ionian Pythagoras, who'd learned it from Pittacus' student Pherecydes. Indeed while traveling, Xenophanes saw a puppy being beaten, and he protested, "Stop! Don't beat the poor thing! Alas, it is the soul of my friend! I recognized his voice when he cried out in pain!" How might those remarks by Xenophanes be evidence that he believed in *metempsychosis*? In other words, how might those remarks by Xenophanes be evidence that he believed in *the transmigration of the soul*?

2. Once again, consider how he protested, "Stop! Don't beat the poor thing! Alas, it is the soul of my friend! I recognized his voice when he cried out in pain!" Assuming that the puppy really was just his friend reincarnated in the body of a puppy, does that make a difference as to whether or not it's okay to beat a puppy? Why or why not? Explain.

3. What is *anthropomorphism*? (If you decide to quote a dictionary definition of the word "anthropomorphism", cite your source. In other words, make sure to credit the dictionary source that you've used.)

4. How did Xenophanes disagree with an anthropomorphic idea of God (or the gods)? According to him, how is the one and only *real* god—*God*—fundamentally different than the *anthropomorphic* gods (or *fake* gods)? Explain.

5. As a pluralist about the origins of matter, Xenophanes believed that more than ἀρχή exists. As a dualist, he believed that two ἀρχαί exist. According to him, what *were* the two ἀρχαί?

6. In his theological investigations, Xenophanes discovered the Justified True Belief (JTB) theory of epistemological knowledge. According to the JTB theory, <u>why is it always true that if you *know* that you're a rainbow then you actually *are* a rainbow</u>? In order to help answer the epistemological question, let propositions "**K**" and "**R**" be defined in the following way …

> **K**: "You *know* that you're a rainbow."
> **R**: "You *are* a rainbow." ("It's *true* that you're a rainbow.")

According to the JTB theory, why is it always necessarily *true* that <u>if you *know* that you're a rainbow then you (*truly*) are a rainbow</u>? (For half of the credit to this question, highlight the row in the truth-table that *contradicts* the JTB theory. Half of your credit for this question depends on highlighting the appropriate row.)

K	R	K→R
T	T	
F	F	
F	T	
T	F	

[According to the JTB theory, why is it always necessarily *true* that
if you *know* that you're a rainbow then you (*truly*) are a rainbow?]